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Winds of Change 
After Modernity 
R~dney Clapp has recently identified Winnie-the-Pooh as a pre-
lllter philosopher in the West. He writes: 
A noted Wes tern philosopher, introduced to the world in 1926, 
Was one day s itting on a log when he heard a buzzi ng sound . He 
Was puzzled a nd fe ll to pondering. As his leading chronicler 
rernen1bers the event, the p hilosopher reasoned a long the fol-
lowing lines: 
"'If there's a bu zz ing-noise, somebody's making a buzzing noise, 
and the only reason for making a buzzing-noise tha t I know of is 
because you're a bee.' 
Then he thought another long time a nd sa id : 'And the only rea-
son For being a bee that I know of is ma king honey.' 
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And then he got up and said : 'And the only reason for making 
honey is so I can eat it."' 1 
Who can resist snickering at Pooh-bear's gleeful and 
unashamed preoccupation with his tummy? Yet, the reasoning 
process by which Pooh concludes that "bees are for me," epito-
mizes a widely accepted 300-year-old philosophical project. This 
project is the invisible backdrop to most of our contemporary 
preoccupations. Since the mid-seventeenth century, modern 
philosophy has advocated three doctrines. 2 First, the individual 
is always prior to and more significant than any larger group of 
which he or she is a part. According to this doctrine, sometimes 
called generic individuali m, a believing community is inciden-
tal to, and really nothing but, the sum of the individual mem-
bers. The real action takes place at the level of the individual 
who must choose his or her master, mate, and mission. Such 
decisions are taken to be the prerequisites for voluntary associ-
ation with like-minded others. 
A second modern doctrine holds that language is nothing but 
a picture of the world. Just as a Polaroid snapshot of my room 
does not rearrange the furniture, language is thought to be a 
neutral depiction of the way the world is. This reductive theory 
about language is called representationalism. According to rep-
resentationalism, words and sentences are expendable bearers 
of more important things called meanings. In this view, truth-
fulness is measured in terms of a sentence's correspondence 
with the ways things really are. 
It is claimed, third, that beliefs are nothing but assertions 
about the way things really are. This theory is sometimes called 
proposilio11.alism. In this view, beliefs always can be, and ought 
to be, subject to rigorous testing. Those beliefs that pass the 
scrutiny of publicly accessible criteria qualify for the supreme 
status of "knowledge." However, strictly speaking, only in regard 
to logic and mathematics can the entence "I know" be voiced 
truthfully-that is, with absolute certa inty. 
What could be more obvious? 
Obvious for whom? Anything that strikes Pooh as obvious 
deserves a second look. Surprisingly, these three dogmas of 
modernity are themselves guilty of reductionism, the over sim-
plification of complexities about selfhood, language, and faith. 
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These dogmas were not the achievement of millennia of search-
ing after philosophical clarity. Rather, they were the emotional 
crutch of an age terrified by a world that was falling apart,3 and 
recent philosophers have begun to migrate away [Tom the con-
ceptual space defined by these three doctrines of modernity. 
Rather than spend time trying to make clear the modern views 
0
.f metaphysics, language, or epistemology, by telling some sto-
nes I will try to give you some inkling of the sorts of directions 
lll which contemporary postcritical or postmodern philosophy 
may be moving. 4 Once I clarify a lternative ways for thinking 
~bout the world, I will make some suggestions as to what evange-
hsm might look like in a post-Pooh age. 
Challenging Individualism 
· According to the received account, conglomerates in the 
Physical world are necessarily nothing more than the sums of 
their parts. For example, molecules are nothing more than the 
sum of their respective atoms; human persons are nothing more 
than the collection of their cells; communities are nothing more 
than the aggregation of their members, and so on. 
On this old-and what we are calling here the modern-view, 
the really real and that which does all the causal work in any ys-
tem are the smallest identifiable parts. Of course, this makes 
Physics th e premier scientific discipline because the direction 
of causation is assumed to move h·om parts to wholes, but not 
th 
e other way around, and phy ics, after all , studies the small-
est parts. 
be Yet. if_ that were true,. then we oug.h t to ~e ~b!e predict the 
. havtor of any group simply by lookmg at mdtviduals. Unfor-
tunately, this simply is not the case. 5 In fact, groups fTequently 
take on a life of their own and act corporately as if the group 
~ere its own sort of entity. For example, imagine a herd of wild 
oars fleeing single-file through dense vegetation with a preda-t~r at th eir heels. Just as the predator is close enough to nibble 
t 1e haunches of the last boar in the line something amazing hap-
Pens. The pack splits, some running left, others running right, 
and as if on cue the entire herd turns to face the now-surrounded 
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predator. How does each boar fleeing for its life manage to act 
in unison with the rest of the herd? 
Or consider another puzzling story. The Hollywood hit Juras-
sic Parle made famous the biological phenomenon that some 
species of African frogs have the ability to spontaneously change 
their gender in order to equilibrate a population in which one 
gender has disappeared. Let's say all the females have been 
removed. How is each male (Tog to know the dif-ference between 
being continuously unlucky at getting a date for Saturday and 
the more serious condition (serious enough for him to change 
gender!) of there being no females at all in the community? 
Consider a third example. We are all familiar with the ability 
of a school of fish to move in unified reaction to our tapping on 
the side of the aquarium. It might be hypothesized that unified 
movement is not a group behavior, but simply an accident: each 
individual fish is similar enough to the others to respond iden-
tically to the same external stimuli. If we managed to put tiny 
blindfolds on the fish and witnessed the same group behavior 
after tapping the glass, I suspect that we would be undaunted, 
for it is conceivable that the fish, each nearly identical to its 
neighbor, might be capable of responding to the sound or even 
to the vibration of our tapping. Of course this explanation only 
works if each fish possesses the faculty necessary for respond-
ing to sight, sound, or whatever. The real surprise would be if 
the school still swam in unison after, in addition to blindfold-
ing them, we stopped their ears and scooped out their brains. 
And yet this is analogous to the Benard phenomenon.6 If a cylin-
der of liquid is heated from below, the blind, deaf, and witless 
molecules of the liquid spontaneously form hexagonal "cells" of 
convection as if an invisible honeycomb had been slipped into 
the container. Within each cell molecules move in a uniform 
way while molecules in a neighboring cell move in a different 
pattern that is uniform for that cell. How does any given mole-
cule "know" to which cell it belongs? 
What are we to make of these mysteries? Should we cone] ude 
that there must be a way to explain these group phenomena 
entirely in terms of the individuals because, after all, groups are 
nothing but the sum of their individual members? Some con-
temporary thinkers beg to differ; group behavior cannot be 
described in terms of individuals precisely because the group is 
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more than the aggregation of its members. Something real 
emerges at the level of the group that has downward causal influ-
ence on the members. How else can we account for the behav-
ior of the amoeba known as Dictyostelium? 
Normally, this single-celled organism goes about its quiet busi-
ness of hunting down, engulfing and digesting bacteria that live 
in soil. After gorging itself sufficiently, Dictyostelium divides in 
two, and the new pair go their separate, bacteria-devouring ways. 
But if the thousands of Dictyosteliwn in a stamp-sized plot of 
soil should eat their surroundings clean, they do something 
exceptional. . .. 
Rathet- than crawling around randomly, the amoebas start 
streaming toward one another in inwardly pulsing ripples. As 
many as 100,000 converge in a swirling mound. And then, remark-
ably, the mound itself begins to act as if it were the organism. It 
stretches out into a bullet-shaped slug the siz of a sand grain 
and begins to move. It slithers up toward the surface of the soil, 
probes specks of dirt, and turns around when it hits a dead end. 
Its movements are slow- it would need a day to travel an inch-
but ... the deliberateness of the movements eerily evoke an it 
rather than a they.7 
Apparently, each Dictyostelium is able to take orders [Tom the 
~Ystem of amoebas as a whole. To put it differently, the organ-
15111S form a group that attains something akin to group con-
s . CJousness. Whatever the mechanism, the group appears able 
to i~fluence its members by the transfer of information without 
~IHch a given amoeba is unable to tell the difference between a 
~calized food shortage and a regional famine. Notice that the ~JrecLion of influence in this case is from the group t? its mem-
. ers, or from the top down. This downward causatwn has an 
1111Portant correlate for human behavior8 
Imagine that you are the dean of students at a small Mid-
~estern religious university and are leading an investigation into 
~ e suicide_ of a twenty-on~-year-old white female student,_ Jane 
_oe . Relatives and acquamtances of all sorts have been mter-
VIewed for clues that might shed light on Jane Doe's choice to 
e~d her young life. The jigsaw puzzle of her life begins to take 
~ ape: the normally hard-working Jane had recently losl her job 
ecause she was unable to stay on task; her academic perform-
19 
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ance had suffered, with grades falling steadily over a six-month 
period; and a long-standing romantic relationship had soured, 
leaving Jane listless and depressed. And, oh yes, an autopsy 
showed that Jane had an unusually low ionic lithium concen-
tration in her bloodstream-a condition typically associated 
with one form of manic depression. 
Now, if asked to identify which of these was the real reason 
Jane committed suicide, the modern analyst would unhesitat-
ingly point to the chemical deficiency as the root cause of Jane's 
behavior, on the assumption that Jane is nothing but the sum of 
her chemicals. But contemporary thinkers are unwilling to be 
so dismissive of what is a more complicated cluster of reasons 
each of which may have contributed to Jane's behavior. So, for 
example, one thinker might justifiably answer the question, 
"Why did Jane commit suicide?" by responding, "Because she 
was Protestant!" 
How can this be? In 1897 Emile Durkheim, the father of soci-
ology, published his finding that suicide rates vary according to 
victims' social groupingsY Protestants had higher suicide rates 
than Roman Catholics; city dwellers had a higher suicide inci-
dence than their rural counterparts; and civilians were more 
likely to commit suicide than military personnel. Durkheim rea-
soned that groups displayed properties that individuals could 
not possess on their own. This is not unreasonable: a single H20 
molecule cannot display the property of wetness because more 
than one molecule is required to establish the surface tension 
considered characteristic of that we experience as wetness. Sim-
ilarly, a single individual living in isolation cannot display the 
property of social cohesiveness. Durkheim hypothesized that 
groups vary according to levels of social cohesiveness . Some 
groups have a high degree of cohesion because members have 
internalized a strong normative framework closely tied with the 
group's identity- family obligations among Italians, religious 
duty among Roman Catholics, nationalist ideals among Shiite 
Muslims. Such nonnative frameworks possessed by the group 
and ingested by members make members resistant to suicide. 
Durkheim's study of suicide is but one example of the way we 
are beginning to understand that groups achieve a certain level 
of reality. Properties emerge at the level of the group that can 
be neither reduced to those operating at the level of the indi-
20 
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vidual nor completely expla ined on ly in terms of individuals. 
Moreover, the group as an ordered whole exerts a top-down 
influence on the individual members by virtue of these emer-
gent group properties. Consequently, even the hardest of the sci-
ences are, albeit reluctantly, beginning to admit that no one dis-
cipline has priority over the others; multiple levels of explanation 
are required because real causal influence emerges and oper-
ate at all levels of complexity. 
. Of course, it is relatively easy for us to admit that a chemical 
Jmbalance may cause aberrant behavior. But it takes much more 
to convi nce us that the reverse is a! o true: behavior alters brain 
chemistry. 10 In recent philosophical parlance, this more com-
Plicated picture of things is called metaphysical holism: a group 
may be more than the sum of its individual parts. In such cases, 
the group itself is causally real, influencing members from the 
top down. 
Ironically, the notion of metaphysical holism is not a new-
fangled thing, but a very old concept that was lost sight of in the 
modern period. When the New Testament speaks of "the Body 
~f Christ," the corporate filling of the Spirit, and the corporate 
new man," or disapprovingly of "the Law" 11 and "principalities 
and powers,'' 12 it is acknowledging powers tha t are inextricably 
b?und up with community li fe and that hold sway over the indi-
Vldual.13 To anticipate a topi c I wi ll take up in more detail la ter, 
We can at leas t provisionally conclude that faithf-u lness .in 
evangelism must simultaneously attend to both the group and 
tl:e individual. But before we consider evangelism, we must con-
Sider two other ways modernity i becoming antiquated. 
Language Constitutes the World 
A second way in which co ntemporary thinking is leaving the 
conceptual space of modernity i by acknowledging the way that 
language constitutes the world. 
The urgency modern thinkers feel for doing analysis misleads 
them: they try to understand the mechanism of language by mis-
cons truing language as one thing and the world as another, a nd 
then investigating the relation hip between the two. The nearly 
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unanimous conclusion of this approach has been that language 
simply pictures the world. 
This strategy is flawed fTom the outset. What does it mean to 
treat language in isolation from the world and the world in iso-
lation from language when we think by means oflanguage? I 
cannot treat the world in isolation [Tom language because it is 
by means of language that I treat anything at all. 
Consider: it is tempting to assume that the mind operates like 
some sort of digital camera that stores a staggering number of 
(Teeze-(Tame snapshots as we proceed through a day. Such snap-
shots are thought to h, in principle at least, available for recall 
and review by the adequately trained brain. A verbal descrip-
tion of the image is thought to be a secondary, add-on step in 
the processing of sensory data. However, as Ludwig Wittgen-
stein observed, an astonishingly high percentage of our mental 
life cannot be accomplished m erely by sequences of images. For 
example, try thinking I expect it to stop raining soon without 
using words. We can conjure images of it raining and then not 
raining. But what would an image of "expectation" or "soon-
ness" look like? That an expectation can be about an imminent 
state of affairs that may or may not come to pass (it may rain 
for another week!) is central to the meaning of this sentence. As 
it turns out, words such as "expect" and "soon" are not incidental 
add-ons to fundamentally image-based mental processing. 
Rather, we cannot catch the principle drift of the sentence with-
out using these very words because language is the means by 
which we thin.lc. 14 
We can also get an inkling that the modern approach may be 
deeply flawed by noti g that if language were merely a picture, 
it could be learned by pointing and naming. However, Wittgen-
stein showed that a word can be defined by pointing to some-
thing only when the overall role of the word in the language is 
already clear. 15 
22 
Suppose, however, someone were Lo object: "It is nol true that 
you must already be master of a language in order to understand 
an ostensive definition: all you need-of course!- is to know or 
guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to . That 
is, whether for exa mple to the shape of the object, or to its color, 
or to its number, and so on." 
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Wittgenstein answers his imaginary interlocutor: "And what 
does 'pointing to the shape', 'pointing to the color' consist in? 
~oint to a piece of paper.-And now point to its shape-now to 
Its color-now to its number (that sounds queer).-How did you 
do it?" 16 Because the same gesture in each instance is intended 
to pick out vastly different aspects (shape, color, number, and 
so on), pointing cannot be the basis by which a nonspeake 
acquire fluency in language, especially his or her first language. 
One of my earliest memories is of an event that occurred 
when I was too young to have mastered the names of the pri-
mary colors. I recall my friends teasing me for not knowing my 
colors. I must have insi ted otherwise because one of them 
~h irped, "Oh yeah, then what is this?" while pointing on a page t a coloring book. "That," she cried triumphantly, "is ~ellow!" 
· Went home very confl.1sed because I knew she had pomted to 
a pear. I could not understand her gesture of pointing until I 
Understood how to use the words color and, in particular, yel-
lo · w m English sentences. 
~hildren initially learn a language not by having objects 
P0111ted out to them-that game comes very much la ter-but by ~eing trained into a form or life. All of us share primitive reac-
tions-we squint at bright lights, we pucker when we suck 
lemons, and so on. Wittgenstein calls these behaviors primitive 
r~actions in order to emphasize their givenness for the func-
ltoning of language. One way (and only one way) to think of the 
~onnection between primitive reactions and language use is to 
1111agine language as going proxy for these other behaviors. 
How do words refer to sensations? ... Here is one possi bility: 
Words are connected with the primitive, the natural , express ions 
of the sensa tion and used in their place. A child has hurl himself 
and he erie ; and then adults talk to him and leach him excla-
ll1ations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-
behavior. 
"S o you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"-
On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces cry ing and 
does not describe itY 
1 Wittgenstein's point is that language doesn't refer to, or pic-Ure, or corre pond to, or depict some nonlinguistic reality; there 
23 
Live to Te ll 
is no way for us to imagine that to which language corresponds 
("a sta te of affairs," "the world," "reality," etc.) except in terms 
of the very language that this "reality" is supposed to be con-
sidered in isolation from. Rather, learning a language is an irre-
ducibly social enterprise th at trains a child into a communal 
mode of living.18 Thus Wittgenstein likens language to a series 
of games that require partners for playing: "In a conversation: 
One person throws a ball; the other does not know: whether he 
is supposed to throw it back, or throw it to a third person, or 
leave it on the ground , or pick it up and put it in his pocket, 
etc." 19 Language is not a picture t ha t succumbs to distanced 
observation, it is a socially involved enterprise that by its very 
na ture engages human subjects. 
We now can see why a nother radical critic of modernity, John 
L. Austin, describes language as "performative." 20 Language is 
a form of action that gets work done. Think of the vast array of 
ways in which language performs work: we make promises, we 
ask questions, we give orders, we make confessions. When I 
spoke the words "I do!" to Jeanne L. Dahle, I didn't describe 
some state of affairs-! changed forever both h er world and 
mine. With and through those words I beca me her husband . 
More ominously, now that we have children, we are painfu lly 
aware of the power of language to nurture or denature our three 
chi ldren, who inhabit a world of either praise or verbal abuse. 
Thus, philosophy has challenged some long-standing assump-
tion about language. Before I show these recent vi ws' signifi-
cance for doing ministry, let me introduce one more way con-
temporary thinking is leaving modernity behind. 
The Shifting of Paradigms 
Nicolaus Copernicus was a Poli sh astronomer whose posthu-
mous publication with th e snappy ti tie On the Revolution of the 
Celestial Orbs (1543) turned the world on its head. Copernicus 
used geometry to argue that, co ntrary to common thinking, the 
Earth revolved around the sun in a regu lar orbit. By 1610 
Galileo Galilei had begun publishing observations of the heav-
ens that he had made by means of his telescope. These obser-
24 
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v~tions corro borated Copernicus's heliocentric model. Despite 
VIolent opposition from the church, multitudes of thinking peo-
ple were converted to the view tha t we inhabit a solar sys tem, 
With the sun at its center, ra ther than a geocentric, o r Earth-
centered, uni verse. 
We must unders tand tha t the stakes for such a conversion 
Were high. Astronomy was not simply a hobby for those who 
had the money and leisure to gaze heavenward. Charting the 
stars was critical for naviga ting Earth's oceans, and knowledge 
?fthe heavenly seasons was integral to skillfully timing the plant-
Ing and harvesting of crops. And for thousands of years, the 
Earth-centered model of the Egypti an as tronomer Ptolemy had 
g~nerated exceptionally accura te sta r charts and calendars . To 
give up this sys tem surely could be done ra tionally only on the 
basis of improved char ts and calendar . Right? Wrong! The real 
Puzzle surrounding the mass conversion to the Copernican view 
Was the fac t that empirical data, such as those improved charts 
and calendars, lagged behind the Ptolemaic system by nearly 
t~o hundred years!2 1 We normally say tha t when we change our 
n1ll1ds, we did so on the bas is of solid evidence. How can we 
account for this mys tery? 
In 1951 W. V. 0. Quine shocked the philosophical world with 
the sugges tion tha t beliefs are as social as they are rational. 
The to ta lity of our so-ca lled knowledge or belief , fl·om the mos t 
casual ma tters of geography and history to the profoundest laws 
of a to mi c physics or even o f pure ma thema tics and logic, is a 
man-made fabric which impinges on experience o nJy along the 
edges .... But the total fi e ld is so undetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, tha t there is much la ti tude of choice as 
to wha t s ta tements to re-evalua te in the light of a ny s ingle con-
trary experi ence. No pa l-ti cular experiences are linked with a ny 
Particular sta tements in the interior o f the fi eld, except indi rec tly 
through considera tions o f equilibrium affec ting the fi eld as a 
whole. 22 
shc~uine suggested tha t we underst~nd hun?an beliefs ~s the 
l at eel property of a human comm umty. 23 Behefs form an mter-b~C~ing se ~; each b l~ ef h a~ a s.take in the reli ability of neigh-
n ng behefs. Expen ence 1mpmges only on the set as a whole 
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by being the "boundary condition" of the web. Experience may 
indeed conflict with beliefs, but in such cases, the conflict is not 
between an isolated belief and a single datum of experience. 
Rather, experience as a whole may generate dissonance within 
the entire web. As tension mounts, the community rushes to 
reestablish equilibrium by a variety of strategies. 
To put it differently, beliefs differ h·om each other only by 
virtue of their distance from the periphery of experience. Those 
beliefs that lie near the periphery are more public and more 
open to change. Those beliefs that are more deeply ingressed 
are more impervious to change. One can imagine that central 
beliefs are hedged in by a buffer of more peripheral beliefs. Ten· 
sion may be resolved by one of three strategies, any of which 
may be reasonable. 
First, the recalcitrant data may simply be ignored. Scientists 
regularly suspend final judgment on puzzling experiment results 
when these results seem to undermine reigning scientific views. 
For example, scattered reports of experiments in which nuclear 
fusion is achieved at room temperature will continue to be 
treated with suspicion precisely because the possibility of cold 
fusion runs against the grain of contemporary theoretical 
physics. Two facts make the current web of beliefs very resilient 
to change: first, too much has been invested (time, research dol-
lars, textbook production, etc.) to scrap it all on the basis of one 
or two anomalies; second, the reigning web of beliefs has a vastly 
greater success rate at explaining hundreds of thousands of 
experimental data than any yet-to-be-formulated replacement 
created to account for the single puzzling anomaly. Thus, one 
reasonable response is to adopt a wait-and-see attitude in antic-
ipation that some fertile minds may eventually concoct ways lO 
understand present anomalies within the spectrum of currentlY 
available theories. And, as the history of science bears out, in 
most cases such a resolution presents itself. 
Second, sometimes tension may be resolved by inventing a 
belief that mollifies the tension by realigning the web. Consider 
a theological example. Early Christians clearly believed that ( 1) 
Jesus was to be worshiped as God, (2) God was one, and (3) Jesus 
and God were distinct. It didn't take long for detractors to object 
that these beliefs constituted a logical contradiction. Of course, 
the problem would dissolve if Christians were willing simply to 
26 
Wind s of Change 
jettison one of these three beliefs, but too much was at stake. 
Denial of Christ's deity is the subordinationist heresy practiced 
by the Arians. Denial of the unity of God would be tantamount 
t? polytheism (or literally, bi- or tritheism). Denial of the dis-
tmction between Jesus and the Father winds up in the heresy 
called modalism. In order to retain all three beliefs, Christians 
constructed the doctrine of the Trinity, which relieved the ten-· 
s!on. The deity of Christ, the singularity of God, and the dis-
tinctiveness of the Father and the Son were each intelligible 
When viewed under the concept aspect of the Trinity. 
Does this mean that the Trinity is just a fiction because it was 
an invention of the believing community? This question is 
wrongheaded. Let me illustrate with an example from the world 
of engineering. Bridges are always in danger of collapsing 
because winds and traffic set them vibrating like guitar strings. 
If the vibrations resonate-a phenomenon in which the ampli-
tude, or strength, of the vibration surges because it matches the 
natural wavelength of the span of the bridge-the bridge is in 
danger of collapsing. To avoid catastrophe, bridge designers 
~ust estimate this danger by solving what are called wave equa-
tions for the bridge. If the solution to the wave equation turns 
o~t to be a certain imaginary number (such as .J~), the bridge 
~Ill not collapse from vibrational stresses. Yet imaginary num-
ers are so called because they cannot be located anywhere on 
the real number line. Does this make them simply fictitious? Of 
course not. Imaginary numbers are real in the sense that they 
are shorthand accounts of safe bridges. Similarly, the concept 
of the Trinity is a shorthand reminder of safe ways we need to 
travel when speaking about God. To speak about God in any 
Other way will land us in heresy. 
Third, tension in the web resulting [TOm the web's inability 
~~ recon_cile itself to recalcitra~t experien~e_may eventually tear 
e fabnc of the web . When this sort of cnSIS occurs, a large set 
~r ~u bset of beliefs may be supplanted by an?ther "'et altoget~er. s~Is wholesale exch~nge of belief s:stems IS called a ~aradtgm 
. ft. Because swappmg takes place m blockhouse fashwn, there 
~not usually a smooth transition from one paradigm to another. 
Wather, the t:an~itio_n is like a Gestalt s"':'itch .. For e~ample, most 
esterners mstmct1vely see the followmg figure m one of two 
Ways: as a three dimensional box coming toward and down to 
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the left of the viewer or as one coming toward them but up to 
the right. Once a viewer fixates on one of these aspects, she can 
force herself to see it under the other aspect. However, when 
this change of aspect dawns, it happens all at once; the figure 
doesn't morph from one aspect to the other-it leaps. 
Similarly, when a paradigm is in crisis, the shift to a new par-
adigm is very rapid and has naturally been described as "a con-
version."24 However, unlike a Gestalt switch, a paradigm shift 
generally is not reversible; once the new paradigm is in place, 
the old way of viewing things is no longer convincing. 
On the other hand, because data gain significance only by 
virtue of their appropriation and interpretation by a conceptual 
scheme (a paradigm is the means by which we interpret data as 
data), 25 the shifting of paradigms cannot be driven by data alone. 
Thomas Kuhn explains: 
The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must 
often do so in defiance of the ev idence provided by problem-
solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will 
succeed with the many large problems that confTont it, knowing 
only that the older paradigm has failed with a few . A decision of 
that kind can only be made on faith .26 
Thus, the swapping of paradigms is reasonable-we have epis-
temic permission to shop around once our old paradigm is in 
crisis-but it is never, strictly speaking, compelled by the data 
for which the new paradigm provides a radically different 
(incommensurable) interpretationY We can now appreciate the 
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ambiguity facing early admirers of Copernicus. Copernicus's 
feometry seemed to make sense, but Ptolemy's model produced 
tt that time) more accurate calendars. So, what was one to do? 
d~ Kuhn's words, those who converted to the Copernican model 
ld so on the basis of faith. 
Summary 
By and large, the differences between the received modernist 
account of reality and that offered by recent postmodern upstarts 
~~so great that it is natural for postmodern (or postcritical) ~h1_nkers to s~eak of their own work as c?nstituting ~ par~digm 
. lft. I have d1scussed three aspects of this new parad1gm m par-~;cular. Fir~~ ' _metaphysical holis_m. is the view that ~r~ups ?ehave 
h ke real entities that both constitute each members 1dent1ty and 
ave top-down causal influence on them. Hence, we are socially 
c~nstituted critters. Second, language accounts for the lion's 
s are of our social make-up (linguistic holism); language is the 
means by which we think and act in the world. Language can-
~ot be pried off the world of experience and analyzed in isola-tJ~n because the conceptual language we think and speak deter-
~lnes the shape of the world we inhabit. Third, the beliefs we 
thld_about our world form an interlocking set that we share with_ 
be~· res t of our c_omn~unity (ep~s.tem.ological_holism)._ This set of 
B lefs, or paradigm, JS very res1hent and typically res1sts change. 
llt when change comes, it comes all at once. 
e Although these new habits of speaking cannot be easily 
hXplained (especially in terms of the modern paradigm), they 
~ve direct implications for understanding evangelism and reli-
gious conversion. Let's tackle conversion first. 
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